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«To cite this version: Christophe Jaffrelot. The caste based mosaic of Indian politics. Seminar, University of Toronto Press, 2012, pp.49-53. ...»

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The caste based mosaic of Indian politics

Christophe Jaffrelot

To cite this version:

Christophe Jaffrelot. The caste based mosaic of Indian politics. Seminar, University of Toronto

Press, 2012, pp.49-53. hal-01024572

HAL Id: hal-01024572


Submitted on 16 Jul 2014

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e The caste based mosaic of Indian politics


WHILE caste politics all over India during the 1990s has been dominated by the Other Backward Classes (OBC) phenomenon, these aggregates – the OBC and India – have gradually lost their relevance, with individual jatis and states becoming the real units of analysis. Many of the regional parties, which now represent half of the Indian voters, are associated with a single caste and/or religious community – and this is also true of some state units of national parties. Such a development is largely due to the fact that the states themselves are often identified with a few jatis. This is the logical outcome of the redrawing of the map of India according to the linguistic criterion, a process which started in the 1950s.

One could even argue that this redrawing of the frontiers of the state in large part stemmed from the demands of dominant castes.

In 1947, India had inherited from the British Raj provinces whose borders had questionable cultural coherence. Most of them had been decided arbitrarily and gathered together several linguistic groups. Though the demand for linguistic states was spelt out primarily in cultural terms – linguistic communities asked for homogenous entities for the sake of communication and education – it was mostly articulated by the dominant castes which had spread throughout the area/domain of one vernacular language. As a result of the redrawing of the Indian map, the Marathas, for instance, became the dominant caste of Maharashtra.1 However, in most states, there were usually two or more dominant castes. In Andhra Pradesh, Kammas and Reddys were locked in some rivalry. Similar, in Karnataka, was the case of the Vokkaligas and the Lingayats, who opposed each other.

After the redrawing of state boundaries, these castes often tended to align themselves with one party. For instance, the Kammas opted for the Communist Party of India while the Reddys favoured the Congress, so much so that while the CPI became the brand name, the sub-text was ‘Kamma’. After some time, a few of these dominant castes decided to form their own party. Kamma leaders, to continue with this example, founded the Telugu Desam Party in the early 1980s, the very reference to the state language reflecting the claim of the party to represent Andhra Pradesh at large. The party chief, N.T. Rama Rao, a popular film actor, won the elections for the first time in 1983. But the two party system constituted by the Reddysupported Congress and the Kamma-supported TDP was disturbed by the emergence of a newcomer in 2008, the Praja Rajyam Party, in turn supported by a caste benefiting from rapid upward social mobility, the Kapus.

Once again a popular film actor, Chiranjeevi, was responsible for launching a party that was conceived as a caste-based electoral machine. ‘Primarily, it emerged out of the aspiration of the elite among the Kapu community to see their man at the helm of the state government. In recent times they seem to have nurtured a grievance that under the rule of the Congress and the TDP, only two communities, namely, the Reddys and the Kammas, exercised supreme political power although the Kapus enjoyed analogous social status and were numerically as large as these communities. They were resentful of the asymmetry between their rise in social and economic prominence and their role as junior partners in power.’2 A few months after its creation, the PRP was able to win 16% of the valid votes polled in Andhra Pradesh in 2009, mainly due to the support of the Kapus. 59% of them voted for the PRP, 59% of the Kammas voted for the TDP, and 59% of the Reddys voted for the Congress,3 a graphic illustration of the role of caste groups behind the electoral performance of parties at the state level, despite claims that their ideology and politics are universalistic or multicultural.

None of the castes associated with political parties, however, vote en bloc for one party; 59% being far from 100%. There are many reasons why so many chose to vote for a party not identified with their caste. First, in some constituencies, two parties or more might have nominated a candidate of the same caste, a common practice in constituencies where intracaste factionalism is pronounced. Second, citizens may choose a party which is not associated with their caste simply because they like it – since governance related issues (among others, charges of corruption, programmes and past record) do influence individual choice.

Third, factions play a significant role within a caste group, especially at the local level. In Uttar Pradesh, G.K. Lieten noticed that among the Jats – one of the state’s dominant castes – ‘the vote is decided collectively, according to the general tendency in the Jat "biradari" (local sub-caste).’4 Lieten even shows that in 1991, the Jats delinked their vote to the state assembly from their vote to elect Members of Parliament at the Centre in order to keep the two main factions of the caste happy. Thus, they decided to vote for the Janata Dal at the general elections, and for the Congress in the state elections. Fourth, as James Manor points out, ‘Shrewd politicians (...) constantly engage – often simultaneously – in efforts to divide social groups (including jatis and jati-clusters) that oppose them and to unite those that offer (or may offer) them support.’5 One of the techniques used by these politicians to divide the vote of castes, which they know are not supportive, consists of promoting (and financing) a ‘dummy’ candidate of the same caste as their main rival(s).6 But the general pattern of voting behaviour in India suggests that as recently as 2009, ‘caste or community continues to be the primary building block of political affiliation at the micro level.’7 Indeed, there are many states in which the majority of a caste group aligns itself to one party. This is more true in states where a two-party system is well entrenched. In Rajasthan, 74% of the Brahmins, 59% of the Jats and 55% of the Rajputs voted for the BJP while 66% of the Dalits voted for the Congress.8 In Punjab, 58% of the upper caste Hindus voted for the Congress and 36% of them for the BJP and its Sikh ally, the SAD (Shiromani Akali Dal). For the Jat Sikhs, it is the reverse: 37% voted for the former and 54% for the latter.9 In Bihar, the Yadavs continued to vote for the RJD of Laloo Prasad Yadav, whereas the upper castes stuck to the BJP and its state ally, the JD(U): in six elections out of eight, between 63% and 77% of them have supported this coalition.10 One may wonder why and how a caste somewhat aligns itself with a party. The ‘how’ can be elucidated more easily. At the local level, especially in a rural context, opinion leaders who are better educated than the average peasant help to shape collective forms of voting behaviour, as James Manor pointed out in his study of the 1980 elections.11 But members of one caste may decide to vote together for one party/candidate without any hesitation because they share not only the same identity but also the same interests. Paul Brass assumes that ‘members of the same caste often carefully calculate how their votes may best serve their collective advantage within any given constituency, and they tend to coalesce with other castes in order to achieve that goal.’12 How can we define this ‘collective advantage’? To answer this question implies a shift from the ‘how’ to the ‘why’. We’ll try to respond by focusing on the lower castes which form the bulk of the voters and which tend to have a higher turnout than the average.13 We need first to understand what elections mean for these plebeians. In her ethnographic work in West Bengal, Mukulika Banerjee convincingly argues that elections offer them ‘an opportunity for the expression of citizenship, and for an understanding of the duties and rights involved in living in a democracy.’14 Banerjee emphasizes that ‘the egalitarian mechanics of the poll afforded (them) particular pleasure.’15 But, besides the symbolic gratification of standing in the

same queue as dominant caste members, rights are at stake. One of her interviewees said:

‘The fact that I can cast my vote is a right. But we have also got our rights through voting.’16 What rights?

In the villages where she did field-work to understand the resilience of the communist domination, Banerjee discovered not only that the land reform implemented by the CPI(M) since its first electoral victory in 1977 had an economic effect – no more famine – but also that ‘the social effect was even more dramatic, genuinely transforming the feudal character of labouring relations, with the lower castes becoming increasingly self-assured. In my research villages, the Syeds (upper caste Muslims) themselves were driven by the new labour costs to sweating in the fields, a heavy symbolic blow given their traditional abhorrence of the plough and manual labour. The sharecroppers could now look them in the eye when talking.

Previously, even riding a bicycle in front of a Syed was considered taboo.’17 In such villages, low caste Hindus and Muslims voted together for the CPI(M) and its allies in order to obtain the symbolic as well as material advantages that land reforms were bound to bring them. The same development is now taking place among the Dalits, not only at the state level – as evident from the case of UP – but at the national level. Our final case study focusing on the BSP will help us respond even better to the ‘how and why’ question.

The building of a pan-Indian Dalit party had been the goal of B.R. Ambedkar for twenty years. He successively initiated the Independent Labour Party (1935), the Scheduled Castes Federation (1942) and the Republican Party of India (1956). But none of them could make an impact, largely because individual Dalit jatis were not prepared to join hands and together support the same party. In fact, the Mahars – Ambedkar’s caste fellows – were the only ones who tended to support his party.

The Bahujan Samaj Party (the party of the masses), which was founded in 1984 by a militant Ambedkarite, Kanshi Ram, has gradually overcome this handicap. In the course of the last two decades it has emerged as a full-fledged Dalit party, largely because it was in a position to cash in on the development of a Dalit counter-culture (including a poignant literature) and programmes of positive discrimination which have given birth to a Dalit middle class whose dedicated members were keen to organize themselves and their caste fellows.

In its stronghold of Uttar Pradesh, where the BSP could rely on the Backward and Minority Communities Employees Federation (BAMCEF), a movement of mostly Dalit public sector employees that Kanshi Ram had organized from the 1970s onwards, the BSP became the third largest party in 1989. It then benefited from being a coalition partner of the Samajwadi Party at the helm of the government of Uttar Pradesh in 1993-95. In this capacity, it advocated policies intended to promote the interests of the Dalits at large, including the Ambedkar Village Scheme.18 Mayawati, the BSP leader, repeated the same strategy when she became chief minister of UP with the support of the BJP in 1996-97 and 2003.19 Eventually, the BSP won a majority of the seats in the state assembly in 2007.

Whenever it has been in office in UP, the BSP has combined both symbolic and substantial measures. On the one hand, it has given the name of Dalit personalities to districts and stadiums and built a large number of Ambedkar statues. On the other hand, it has ‘accomplished the fullest implementation of quotas ever achieved in the state.’20 It has also made decisions which are both symbolic and substantial, like the strict implementation of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (1989), which has deeply transformed social relations at the local level.

In her remarkable doctoral thesis on the BSP in East and West UP, Sohini Guha cites one of her Rajput informers as follows: ‘Earlier, these low caste men would stand up when they saw us (i.e. Thakurs) coming from a mile away. Now, forget standing up, they invite us to sit on their charpai (string beds) and drink tea! The cheek of it! Times have changed, these days are not good for us. We have to swallow these insults. Earlier, we would have knocked their teeth out, or worse, for this behaviour.’21 The BSP has gradually reinforced its standing among Dalits at large, so much so that it is not, any more, a party of one jati, the Chamars (the caste of Mayawati), but a party of the majority of UP Dalits and even a party for Dalits living out of Uttar Pradesh, as evident from the accompanying table.

–  –  –

Since no individual Dalit jati represents more than 20% of the Scheduled Castes in any state of India, the figures suggest that in Chhattisgarh, Delhi and Haryana, non-Chamars (or Jatavs) Dalits have also voted for the BSP in 2009. The same table makes this point explicit in the case of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh where the party is now a full-fledged Dalit party since more than 60% of all Dalit jatis, which used to be locked in rivalry (especially the Chamars or Jatavs and the Pasis or Dusadh) now together largely support the BSP.

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