WWW.DISSERTATION.XLIBX.INFO
FREE ELECTRONIC LIBRARY - Dissertations, online materials
 
<< HOME
CONTACTS



Pages:     | 1 |   ...   | 2 | 3 || 5 | 6 |

«The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government Jean Tirole∗ Eric Maskin First version, April 2001 Revised, March 2004 Abstract We build ...»

-- [ Page 4 ] --

The tyranny of the majority is an old theme of political thought. We have already quoted Madison on this point. In the Federalist Papers Alexander Hamilton proposed that the judiciary should control the encroachments and oppressions of the representative

body and that insulating it from accountability is important for this role:

If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.

Still, despite the risks that RD poses for minority rights, we will suggest that it safeguards them better than direct democracy (recall Butler and Ranney (1994) on the pitfalls of democracy; see footnote 5).

We introduce a variant of the basic model in which there are two groups, the majority and the minority. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the majority knows that action a is its optimal choice. Similarly, the minority knows that action b is best for it.

What is not known is which action maximizes overall welfare. With probability x the majority should prevail, because action a imposes only a small negative externality on 25 the minority; let B 0 be the overall social benefit of action a over action b in that case (we normalize social welfare under action b to be 0). With probability 1 − x, the minority should prevail: action a imposes a large externality on the minority and generates overall net loss L 0 relative to action b. B can be interpreted as the social loss when the minority blocks a socially desirable move, whereas L is the social loss from a move that oppresses the minority.

Finally, we assume that there are three types of officials: those who are congruent with the majority (labeled “M ”and having probability πM ); those who are congruent with the minority (labeled “m” and having probability π m ) ;and those who balance the two groups’ interests and so have preferences in line with social welfare ( labeled “W ” and having probability πW ). The preferences of the three types of officials are summarized in table 1.

Let us look at the welfare implications of our three benchmark institutions:

–  –  –

As one would expect, direct democracy fares better relative to judicial power when the loss from the externality is small (L small) or unlikely (x large), and when officials tend to be biased toward interest groups (π W low).

Representative democracy: The analysis of RD is similar to that of section III. Let us begin with the pandering case δ 1. In that case, even a W official who knows that the minority should prevail prefers to cater to the majority in period 1. As in section III, RD delivers the same outcome as DD in period 1 and the same as JP in period 2. It is therefore dominated.

Next suppose that δ 1, so that there is no pandering. Action a is chosen by an M official and, with probability x, by a W official. Action b is selected by an M official and, with probability 1 − x, by a W official. Thus, the majority will not reelect an official who has chosen b, and so representative democracy weeds out M and (less effectively) W officials.

Proposition 3 For all δ (i) There exist thresholds x∗ and x∗∗ ( x∗ x∗∗ for δ 1, x∗ = x∗∗ for δ 1, where 0 x∗ ≤ x∗∗ 1) such that if x x∗, JP is optimal, if x∗ ≤ x ≤ x∗∗, RD is optimal, if x∗∗ x, DD is optimal, where x is the probability that the majority should prevail.

¡ ¢∗ ¡ ¢∗∗ ¡¡ B ¢∗ ¡ B ¢∗∗ ¢ (ii) Similarly, there exist thresholds B and B = L if δ 1 such that L L L ¡ B ¢∗ if B L, JP is optimal, L ¡ B ¢∗ B ¡ B ¢∗∗ if L ≤ L ≤ L, RD is optimal, ¡ ¢∗∗ B if B L, DD is optimal, L

–  –  –

W DD, W JP and W RD are increasing in x. W JP is the highest of the three for x = 0, W DD the highest for x = 1, and, for the value x such that W DD = W JP,

–  –  –

since w∗ wDD = wJP.

Thus, for low values of x or B/L, JP is optimal; these are the ranges for which minority rights are most important, and RD and DD lead to the majority-preferred decision too often. For moderate values of x or B/L, RD is optimal; RD is better than DD because it entails some chance that the decision will be taken by an m or W official. But RD does not overweight these officials this bias like JP. Finally, for high values of x or B/L, DD is optimal (since, in this section, we assume away imperfect knowledge about the optimal action on the part of the electorate, we might as well let the majority decide directly if the minority stands to lose relatively little).

The Constitution as a decision allocating device Proposition 3 suggests a possible interpretation of the the U.S. Constitution. Let us suppose that x is rarely so high that DD is desirable. Then, it becomes desirable to distinguish between those cases in which x is (moderately) high (so that RD is optimal) and those in which x is low (JP is optimal).

The Constitution provides a means of making this distinction operational. If a decision bears on some Constitutional guarantee, this is a sign that x is low, i.e., that a minority’s rights are in jeopardy. And, indeed, the decision mechanism in such a case is to assign the decision to the Federal courts, the embodiment of judicial power. In the absence of a Constitutional issue, however, the presumption is that x is not especially low, and the policy decision remains in the realm of representative democracy.





28 VI. Summary and avenues for further research

The paper’s main findings can be summarized as follows:

(1) Accountability has two potential benefits. It allows voters to remove officials whose interests appear to be noncongruent with the electorate, but also gives noncongruent officials some incentive to act as though they were congruent (through the effect of forwardlooking or partial pandering).

(2) However accountability may encourage officials to pander to the electorate and overlook minority interests.

(3) Nonaccountability is most desirable when (a) the electorate is poorly informed about the optimal action, (b) acquiring decision-relevant information is costly, (c) feedback about the quality of decisons is slow. Therefore, technical decisions, in particular, may be best allocated to judges or appointed bureaucrats.

(4) The most important decisions should be taken by elected rather than nonaccountable officials (although direct democracy may have the edge over representative democracy for such decisions).

(5) The discretion of nonaccountable officials should be more limited than that of accountable ones.

(6) Nonaccountability is preferable when the majority’s preferences are very likely to inflict large negative externalities on the minority. However, representative democracy is better in this case than direct democracy, and, for moderate probabilities of negative externalities, may constitute a desirable compromise between the two extremes.

This paper is only a first step in the analysis of how constitutional design affects public choices. Many other issues of interest come to mind. First, extending the model to more than two periods would lead to a richer set of feasible institutions. For example, in a four-period model, the policy of giving an official an initial tenure of two periods 29 and then making her mandate renewable by vote in each of the last two periods can be shown to make some sense. Second, the analysis could be extended to an international context; we could get at the idea that elected officials may have a harder time establishing credibility internationally (e.g., in arms talks or in negotiating with the IMF) because of their incentive to pander domestically. That is, pandering to multiple audiences may be difficult. Third, we could study alternative nomination processes for judges and agency commissioners rather than maintain our current assumption that they are simply selected at random. Fourth, we could enrich the model to allow for the possibility that campaign contributions affect politicians’ choices. Fifth, the model could be extended to allow elected officials to “pass the buck” by calling for a public referendum. Finally, some of our analysis might be applied to the media. People often read newspapers or watch television networks that confirm their prejudices; in other words, the media pander in much the same way that politicians do.

We hope that these extensions and others will be pursued in future research.

30 Appendix We shall suppose that there is a small proportion ρ of officials with weak office-holding motives (so that they will choose actions in the first period according to their true preferences). Call these the ideological officials. A proportion π of these are congruent; the remainder 1 − π are noncongruent.

Proposition A1 When δ 1 and q = 0, the unique pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium of RD in the limit when ρ → 0 is a pure pandering equilibrium in which the official always chooses a in period 1 and is reelected if and only if she chooses a. The same conclusion holds for mixed-strategy equilibria if we impose the Markov requirement of footnote 21.

Throughout assume that ρ 0. Suppose, contrary to the proposition, Proof.

there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which all types of nonideological officials choose b in period 1. Then the choice of a will lead the electorate to believe that the chooser is an ideological congruent official with probability πp/ [πp + (1 − π) (1 − p)] π and so will reelect her. By contrast, the choice of b will lead the electorate to believe that the official is noncongruent with probability exceeding 1 − π, and so will not reelect. Thus, nonideological type (C, a) cannot choose b in period 1 after all.

Suppose next that there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which some nonideological types choose a and others choose b. Then, for ρ sufficiently small, the probability of an official’s being congruent conditional on her choosing a in the first period will either be strictly greater than π or strictly less than π. In the former case, an official will be reelected if and only if she chose a, and in the latter if and only if she chose b. So, in either case, all nonideological officials will have the incentive to behave the same way (in order to get reelected), a contradiction. Thus the proposition is established for pure-strategy equilibria.

Next, allow for mixed strategy equilibria but impose the Markov requirement. Suppose that at least one type of nonideological offical chooses a with positive probability in equilibrium. Because δ 1 note that the (C, a) and (N, b) types have a stronger preference 31 for a over b than do the (C, b) and (N, a) types. Hence, in equilibrium, the former group chooses a with at least as high probability as the latter group. Furthermore, from the Markov assumption, the (C, a) and (N, b) types must play a with the same probability.

Similarly the (C, b) and (N, a) officials must play a with the same probability. Thus, since the proportion of (C, a)s to (N, b)s is πp/ (1 − π) (1 − p) ( π/ (1 − π)), the electorate will attach a probability greater than π to the official’s being congruent if a is chosen and so will reelect her. [This is so even if the (C, b) and (N, a) types choose a with probability 1, because in this case, the ideological officials will tip the balance in favor of reelection].

Symmetrically, an official will fail to be reelected if she chooses b.

Because officials are reelected if and only if they choose a, nonideological officials will opt for a, since δ 1.

1+δ Proposition A2 When qδ, the unique limit of perfect Bayesian equilibria as ρ → 0 2 is an FLP equilibrium in which an official is reelected if and only if she has chosen (i) the optimal action when there is feedback or (ii) action a if there is no feedback.

We claim first that, in equilibrium with ρ 0, if the electorate obtains Proof.

feedback about an official’s first-period choice, the official will be reelected if and only if the decision was optimal.

To see this, suppose that a is the chosen decision and that the electorate has learned that it is optimal. If, in equilibrium, no type of nonideological official chooses a with positive probability when a is optimal, the electorate will infer from the feedback that a congruent ideological official has chosen a, and so will reelect. Similarly, if in equilibrium some type of nonideological official chooses a with positive probability, when a is optimal, then the probability that (C, a) chooses a must be at least as big as the probability that (N, a) does so (since (C, a)’s preference for a is stronger than that of (N, a)). Thus, if it incorporates the possibility of a congruent ideological official, the probability that an official is congruent conditional on a having been chosen and revealed optimal is strictly greater than π, and so the electorate will again reelect the official.

Suppose instead that a has been revealed to be nonoptimal. If, in equilibrium, no nonideological type chooses a with positive probability when a is nonoptimal, the electorate will infer from the feedback that a noncongruent ideological official has chosen a, and so will not reelect. Similarly, if, in equilibrium, some nonideological official chooses a with positive probability when a is nonoptimal, then the probability that (N, b) chooses a must be at least as big as that that (C, b) does so (since (N, b)’s preference for a is stronger than that of (C, b)). Thus, including the possibility of a noncongruent ideological official, the probability that an official is noncongruent conditional on a having been chosen and revealed nonoptimal is strictly greater than 1 − π, and so the electorate will not reelect the official, establishing the claim for a. The argument for b is entirely symmetric.



Pages:     | 1 |   ...   | 2 | 3 || 5 | 6 |


Similar works:

«OUR FIRST OLD AGE PENSION 1915-1927 Summary Canada was a changed nation by the end of the First World War (1914-1918). War-time demand led to more industrial production. The urban labour force grew, so that by the 1920s most people lived in the city rather than the country. New factories favoured the young, and jobs that were traditionally done by older people began to disappear. Seniors could look forward to living longer, but many lived in severe poverty. Workers who supported aging parents...»

«8/20/2014 4:59 PM Sexually Transmitted Diseases Treatment Guidelines, 2014 This information is distributed solely for the purpose of pre-dissemination peer review under applicable information quality guidelines. It has not been formally disseminated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. It does not represent and should not be construed to represent any agency determination or policy. Contents Introduction Methods Clinical Prevention Guidance STD/HIV Prevention Counseling Prevention...»

«Revisiting the Classical View of Bene.ts-Based Taxation Matthew Weinzierl February 11, 2014 Abstract Commentary and political rhetoric on taxes in the United States have long included appeals to Smith’ (1776) classical logic of bene.t based taxation in which an individual’ bene.t from s s the state is tied to his or her income-earning ability. Modern optimal tax theory, in contrast, largely ignores the principle of bene.t based taxation. This paper shows that the classical logic of bene.t...»

«Retrospectives | 3 Spring 2014 Journey’s End: An Account of the Changing Responses Towards the First World War’s Representation Amanda Phipps* This article examines newspaper reviews which highlight changing responses to R. C. Sherriff’s Journey’s End in three of the play’s major runs in 1928-1930, 1972 and 2011. These three productions followed Sherriff’s original script surprisingly closely, observing an officers’ dugout in the days before a major German attack in 1918. The...»

«CHAPTER 4. PERSONALISED LEARNING AND CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH – 63 Chapter 4 Personalised Learning and Changing Conceptions of Childhood and Youth by Yvonne Hébert and William J. Hartley∗ Hébert and Hartley take the example of Canada as indicative of changing conceptions of youth that occur through societies, shaped by moral, socio-economic, political and legal influences. These include the appearance of a more liberal Christianity, the growth of industrial and...»

«Queensland Environmental Offsets Policy Significant Residual Impact Guideline Nature Conservation Act 1992 Environmental Protection Act 1994 Marine Parks Act 2004 December 2014 Prepared by: Biodiversity Integration and Offsets, Ecosystem Outcomes,, Department of Environment and Heritage Protection © State of Queensland, 2014. The Queensland Government supports and encourages the dissemination and exchange of its information. The copyright in this publication is licensed under a Creative...»

«THE CEIBA TREE AS A MULTIVOCAL SIGNIFIER: Afro-Cuban Symbolism, Political Performance, and Urban Space in the Cuban Republic Joseph Hartman, M.A. Student, Department of Art Education and Art History, University of North Texas INTRODUCTION: AFRO-CUBAN SYMBOLISM, POLITICAL PERFORMANCE, AND URBAN SPACE Ivor Miller’s article “Religious Symbolism in Cuban Political Performance” brings to light an interesting phenomenon: twentieth-century Cuban politicians used symbols that were associated with...»

«David Schwartz Head of Global Policy Cigna Federal Affairs June 22, 2015 601 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW VIA ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION TO http://www.chronic_care@finance.senate.gov Suite 835, South Building Washington, DC 20004 (202) 719-6499 The Honorable Johnny Isakson David.Schwartz@Cigna.com United States Senate 131 Russell Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510 The Honorable Mark Warner United States Senate 475 Russell Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510 Dear Senators Isakson and...»

«i Land, Water and Local People: A Case Study of Bangalore Mysore Infrastructure Corridor Submitted by Atul Vikas Kulkarni A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Habitat Policy and Practice School of Habitat Studies Tata Institute of Social Sciences Mumbai 2012 ii DECLARATION I, Atul Vikas Kulkarni, hereby declare that this dissertation entitled ‘Land, Water and Local People: A case study of Bangalore Mysore Infrastructure...»

«COMING TO TERMS WITH 21ST CENTURY BRITISH POLITICS: AN INTERVIEW WITH TOBY LITT JOURNAL OF ENGLISH STUDIES VOLUME 9 (2011), 277-286 COMING TO TERMS WITH 21ST CENTURY BRITISH POLITICS: AN INTERVIEW WITH TOBY LITT BETSABÉ NAVARRO ROMERO* Santiago de Compostela University ABSTRACT. English novelist and short story writer, Toby Litt is the author of the novels Beatniks: An English Road Movie (1997), Corpsing (2000), Deadkidsongs (2001), Finding Myself (2003), Ghost Story (2004), Hospital (2007), I...»

«NOT JUST THE SUBURBS ANYMORE: CAN THE SUBURBAN COMMUNITY OF EL DORADO HILLS, CALIFORNIA BECOME A SUSTAINABLE SUBURB? A Thesis Presented to the faculty of the Department of Public Policy and Administration California State University, Sacramento Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE in Urban Land Development by Ellen Desvarro SUMMER 2012 © 2012 Ellen Desvarro ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii NOT JUST THE SUBURBS ANYMORE: CAN THE SUBURBAN COMMUNITY OF EL...»

«ENVIRONMENTAL NETWORK GOVERNANCE IN ROMANIA: TRANSNATIONAL NORM ENTREPRENEURS IN THE SHADOW OF THE EU Cristina E. Parau cristina.parau@wolfson.ox.ac.uk Forthcoming in Lavian Stan (ed.) (2015) Post-Communist Romania at 25: Linking Past, Present and Future, Boulder CO: Rowman & Littlefield. Introduction The ascendant practices of governance in contemporary Europe are known collectively as the new modes of governance. Their diffusion to the post-Communist periphery of Europe might therefore seem...»





 
<<  HOME   |    CONTACTS
2016 www.dissertation.xlibx.info - Dissertations, online materials

Materials of this site are available for review, all rights belong to their respective owners.
If you do not agree with the fact that your material is placed on this site, please, email us, we will within 1-2 business days delete him.