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«European Stress Tests for Nuclear Power Plants National Report FINLAND 3/0600/2011 December 30, 2011 Tomi Routamo (ed.) © Radiation and Nuclear ...»

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European Stress Tests for Nuclear Power Plants

National Report

FINLAND

3/0600/2011

December 30, 2011

Tomi Routamo (ed.)

© Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 2011

Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report i (xvii)

3/0600/2011

Nuclear Reactor Regulation December 30, 2011 Public CONTENTS Abbreviations

Authors

Executive summary

A. Background information on National Report

A.1 General view on NPPs and nuclear power regulation in Finland

A.2 Earthquakes – seismicity in Finland and Finnish requirements

A.3 Flooding – Finnish requirements

A.4 Extreme weather conditions – Finnish requirements

A.5 Electrical power supply – Finnish requirements

A.6 Severe accident management – Finnish requirements

A.7 Actions initiated in Finland after the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident

B. Fortum – Loviisa 1&2

B.1 General data about the site and nuclear power plant units

B.1.1 Brief description of the site characteristics

B.1.1.1 Main characteristics of the units

B.1.1.2 Description of the systems for conduction of main safety functions

B.1.2 Significant differences between units

B.1.3 Use of PSA as part of the safety assessment

B.2 Earthquakes

B.2.1 Design basis

B.2.1.1 Earthquake against which the plant is designed

B.2.1.2 Provisions to protect the plant against the design basis earthquake

B.2.1.3 Compliance of the plant with its current licensing basis

B.2.2 Evaluation of safety margins

B.2.2.1 Range of earthquake leading to severe fuel damage

B.2.2.2 Range of earthquake leading to loss of containment integrity

B.2.2.3 Earthquake exceeding the design basis earthquake for the plant and consequent flooding exceeding design basis flood

B.2.2.4 Measures which can be envisaged to increase robustness of the plant against earthquakes

B.3 Flooding

B.3.1 Design basis

B.3.1.1 Flooding against which the plant is designed

Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report ii (xvii) 3/0600/2011 Nuclear Reactor Regulation December 30, 2011 Public B.3.1.2 Provisions to protect the plant against the design basis flood

B.3.1.3 Plant’s compliance with its current licensing basis

B.3.2 Evaluation of safety margins

B.3.2.1 Estimation of safety margin against flooding

B.3.2.2 Measures which can be envisaged to increase robustness of the plant against flooding

B.4 Extreme weather conditions

B.4.1 Design basis

B.4.1.1 Reassessment of weather conditions used as design basis

B.4.2 Evaluation of safety margins

B.4.2.1 Estimation of safety margin against extreme weather conditions

B.4.2.2 Measures which can be envisaged to increase robustness of the plant against extreme weather conditions

B.5 Loss of electrical power and loss of ultimate heat sink

B.5.1 Loss of electrical power

B.5.1.1 Loss of off-site power

B.5.1.2 Loss of off-site power and loss of the ordinary back-up AC power sources

B.5.1.3 Loss of off-site power and loss of the ordinary back-up AC power sources, and loss of permanently installed diverse back-up AC power sources

B.5.1.4 Conclusions on the adequacy of protection against loss of electrical power

B.5.1.5 Measures which can be envisaged to increase robustness of the plant in case of loss of electrical power

B.5.2 Loss of the decay heat removal capability/ultimate heat sink

B.5.2.1 Design provisions to prevent the loss of the primary ultimate heat sink

B.5.2.2 Loss of the primary ultimate heat sink

B.5.2.3 Loss of the primary ultimate heat sink and the alternate heat sink

B.5.2.4 Conclusions on the adequacy of protection against loss of ultimate heat sink............... 73 B.5.2.5 Measures which can be envisaged to increase robustness of the plant in case of loss of ultimate heat sink

B.5.3 Loss of the primary ultimate heat sink, combined with station blackout

B.5.3.1 Time of autonomy of the site before loss of normal cooling condition of the reactor core and spent fuel pool

B.5.3.2 External actions foreseen to prevent fuel degradation

B.5.3.3 Measures, which can be envisaged to increase robustness of the plant in case of loss of primary ultimate heat sink, combined with station blackout............... 76 B.6 Severe accident management

B.6.1 Organization and arrangements of the licensee to manage accidents

Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report iii (xvii) 3/0600/2011 Nuclear Reactor Regulation December 30, 2011 Public B.6.1.1 Organisation of the licensee to manage the accident

B.6.1.2 Possibility to use existing equipment

B.6.1.3 Evaluation of factors that may impede accident management and respective contingencies

B.6.1.4 Conclusions on the adequacy of organisational issues for accident management......... 82 B.6.1.5 Measures which can be envisaged to enhance accident management capabilities....... 83 B.6.2 Accident management measures in place at the various stages of a scenario of loss of the core cooling function

B.6.2.1 Before occurrence of fuel damage in the reactor pressure vessel

B.6.2.2 After occurrence of fuel damage in the reactor pressure vessel





B.6.2.3 After failure of the reactor pressure vessel

B.6.3 Maintaining the containment integrity after occurrence of significant fuel damage in the reactor core

B.6.3.1 Elimination of fuel damage / meltdown at high pressure

B.6.3.2 Management of hydrogen risks inside the containment

B.6.3.3 Prevention of the containment overpressure

B.6.3.4 Prevention of re-criticality

B.6.3.5 Prevention of basemat melt through

B.6.3.6 Need for and supply of electrical AC and DC power and compressed air to equipment used for protecting containment integrity

B.6.3.7 Measuring and control instrumentation needed for protecting containment integrity

B.6.3.8 Capability for severe accident management in case of simultaneous core melt/fuel damage accidents at different units on the same site

B.6.3.9 Conclusions on the adequacy of severe accident management systems for protection of containment integrity

B.6.3.10 Measures which can be envisaged to enhance capability to maintain containment integrity after occurrence of severe fuel damage

B.6.4 Accident management measures to restrict the radioactive releases

B.6.4.1 Radioactive releases after loss of containment integrity

B.6.4.2 Accident management after uncovering of the top of fuel in the fuel pool

B.6.4.3 Conclusions on the adequacy of measures to restrict the radioactive releases.............. 97 B.6.4.4 Measures which can be envisaged to enhance capability to restrict radioactive releases

B.7 General conclusions

B.7.1 Key provisions enhancing robustness (already implemented)

B.7.2 Safety issues

B.7.3 Potential safety improvements and further work forecasted

Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report iv (xvii) 3/0600/2011 Nuclear Reactor Regulation December 30, 2011 Public C. TVO – Olkiluoto 1&2

C.1 General data about the site and nuclear power plant units

C.1.1 Brief description of the site characteristics

C.1.1.1 Main characteristics of the units

C.1.1.2 Description of the systems for conduction of main safety functions

C.1.2 Significant differences between units

C.1.3 Use of PSA as part of the safety assessment

C.2 Earthquakes

C.2.1 Design basis

C.2.1.1 Earthquake against which the plant is designed

C.2.1.2 Provisions to protect the plant against the design basis earthquake

C.2.1.3 Compliance of the plant with its current licensing basis

C.2.2 Evaluation of safety margins

C.2.2.1 Range of earthquake leading to severe fuel damage

C.2.2.2 Range of earthquake leading to loss of containment integrity

C.2.2.3 Earthquake exceeding the design basis earthquake for the plant and consequent flooding exceeding design basis flood

C.2.2.4 Measures which can be envisaged to increase robustness of the plant against earthquakes

C.3 Flooding

C.3.1 Design basis

C.3.1.1 Flooding against which the plant is designed

C.3.1.2 Provisions to protect the plant against the design basis flood

C.3.1.3 Plant compliance with its current licensing basis

C.3.2 Evaluation of safety margins

C.3.2.1 Estimation of safety margin against flooding

C.3.2.2 Measures which can be envisaged to increase robustness of the plant against flooding

C.4 Extreme weather conditions

C.4.1 Design basis

C.4.1.1 Reassessment of weather conditions used as design basis

C.4.2 Evaluation of safety margins

C.4.2.1 Estimation of safety margin against extreme weather conditions

C.4.2.2 Measures which can be envisaged to increase robustness of the plant against extreme weather conditions

C.5 Loss of electrical power and loss of ultimate heat sink

Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report v (xvii) 3/0600/2011 Nuclear Reactor Regulation December 30, 2011 Public C.5.1 Loss of electrical power

C.5.1.1 Loss of off-site power

C.5.1.2 Loss of off-site power and loss of the ordinary back-up AC power sources

C.5.1.3 Loss of off-site power and loss of the ordinary back-up AC power sources, and loss of permanently installed diverse back-up AC power sources

C.5.1.4 Conclusions on the adequacy of protection against loss of electrical power.................149 C.5.1.5 Measures which can be envisaged to increase robustness of the plant in case of loss of electrical power

C.5.2 Loss of the decay heat removal capability/ultimate heat sink

C.5.2.1 Design provisions to prevent the loss of the primary ultimate heat sink

C.5.2.2 Loss of the primary ultimate heat sink

C.5.2.3 Loss of the primary ultimate heat sink and the alternate heat sink

C.5.2.4 Conclusions on the adequacy of protection against loss of ultimate heat sink.............155 C.5.2.5 Measures which can be envisaged to increase robustness of the plant in case of loss of ultimate heat sink

C.5.3 Loss of the primary ultimate heat sink, combined with station blackout

C.5.3.1 Time of autonomy of the site before loss of normal cooling condition of the reactor core and spent fuel pool

C.5.3.2 External actions foreseen to prevent fuel degradation

C.5.3.3 Measures, which can be envisaged to increase robustness of the plant in case of loss of primary ultimate heat sink, combined with station blackout.............157 C.6 Severe accident management

C.6.1 Organization and arrangements of the licensee to manage accidents

C.6.1.1 Organisation of the licensee to manage the accident

C.6.1.2 Possibility to use existing equipment

C.6.1.3 Evaluation of factors that may impede accident management and respective contingencies

C.6.1.4 Conclusions on the adequacy of organisational issues for accident management.......163 C.6.1.5 Measures which can be envisaged to enhance accident management capabilities.....164 C.6.2 Accident management measures in place at the various stages of a scenario of loss of the core cooling function

C.6.2.1 Before occurrence of fuel damage in the reactor pressure vessel

C.6.2.2 After occurrence of fuel damage in the reactor pressure vessel

C.6.2.3 After failure of the reactor pressure vessel

C.6.3 Maintaining the containment integrity after occurrence of significant fuel damage in the reactor core

C.6.3.1 Elimination of fuel damage / meltdown at high pressure

Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report vi (xvii) 3/0600/2011 Nuclear Reactor Regulation December 30, 2011 Public C.6.3.2 Management of hydrogen risks inside the containment

C.6.3.3 Prevention of the containment overpressure

C.6.3.4 Prevention of re-criticality

C.6.3.5 Prevention of basemat melt through

C.6.3.6 Need for and supply of electrical AC and DC power and compressed air to equipment used for protecting containment integrity

C.6.3.7 Measuring and control instrumentation needed for protecting containment integrity

C.6.3.8 Capability for severe accident management in case of simultaneous core melt / fuel damage accidents at different units on the same site

C.6.3.9 Conclusions on the adequacy of severe accident management systems for protection of containment integrity

C.6.3.10 Measures which can be envisaged to enhance capability to maintain containment integrity after occurrence of severe fuel damage..................173 C.6.4 Accident management measures to restrict the radioactive releases

C.6.4.1 Radioactive releases after loss of containment integrity

C.6.4.2 Accident management after uncovering of the top of fuel in the fuel pool

C.6.4.3 Conclusions on the adequacy of measures to restrict the radioactive releases............174 C.6.4.4 Measures which can be envisaged to enhance capability to restrict radioactive releases

C.7 General conclusions

C.7.1 Key provisions enhancing robustness (already implemented)

C.7.2 Safety issues

C.7.3 Potential safety improvements and further work forecasted

D. TVO – Olkiluoto 3

D.1 General data about the site and the nuclear power plant unit

D.1.1 Brief description of the site characteristics

D.1.1.1 Main characteristics of the units

D.1.1.2 Description of the systems for conduction of main safety functions

D.1.2 Significant differences between units

D.1.3 Use of PSA as part of the safety assessment

D.2 Earthquakes

D.2.1 Design basis

D.2.1.1 Earthquake against which the plant is designed

D.2.1.2 Provisions to protect the plant against the design basis earthquake

D.2.1.3 Compliance of the plant with its current licensing basis

D.2.2 Evaluation of safety margins

Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report vii (xvii) 3/0600/2011 Nuclear Reactor Regulation December 30, 2011 Public D.2.2.1 Range of earthquake leading to severe fuel damage

D.2.2.2 Range of earthquake leading to loss of containment integrity

D.2.2.3 Earthquake exceeding the design basis earthquake for the plant and consequent flooding exceeding design basis flood

D.2.2.4 Measures which can be envisaged to increase robustness of the plant against earthquakes



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