«FAO ANIMAL PRODUCTION AND HEALTH paper GOOD PRACTICES FOR BIOSECURITY IN THE PIG SECTOR Issues and options in developing and transition countries ...»
FAO ANIMAL PRODUCTION AND HEALTH
GOOD PRACTICES FOR
THE PIG SECTOR
Issues and options in developing and transition countries
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Center: ©VIKTAR STRALKOUSKI - Fotolia.com Right: ©FAO/J. Annelli 169
FAO ANIMAL PRODUCTION AND HEALTHpaper
GOOD PRACTICES FOR
THE PIG SECTORIssues and options in developing and transition countries
THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
THE WORLD ORGANISATION FOR ANIMAL HEALTH
THE WORLD BANKRome, 2010 Recommended citation Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/World Organisation for Animal Health/World Bank. 2010. Good practices for biosecurity in the pig sector – Issues and options in developing and transition countries. FAO Animal Production and Health Paper No. 169. Rome, FAO.
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), or of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) or of the International Bank for Reconstruction and development/The World Bank concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The mention of speciﬁc compa- nies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by FAO, OIE or The World Bank in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of FAO, OIE or the Executive Directors of The World Bank.
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Acknowledgements This report was written on behalf of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the World Bank, under the overall guidance and responsibility of Dr J. Domenech and his successor Dr J. Lubroth, Chief Veterinary Officers of FAO.
The writers were François Madec, Deputy Director of the French Agency for Food Safety (AFSSA), Veterinary Research Laboratory, Ploufragan (France); Daniel Hurnik, University of Prince Edward Island (Canada); and Vincent Porphyre and Eric Cardinale, veterinarians and researchers in animal husbandry and epidemiology at the International Cooperation Centre of Agricultural Research for Development (CIRAD).
The report was reviewed by a multidisciplinary team from FAO (Philippe Ankers, Nicoline de Haan, Klaas Dietze, Vittorio Guberti, Nick Honhold, Anthony Burnett and Juan Lubroth), OIE (Alain Dehove, Kathleen Glynn, Kazuaki Miyagishima and Alex Thiermann) and the World Bank (Jean Kamanzi, Brian Bedard, Nancy Morgan, Stephane Forman and Jimmy Smith), together with international experts (Sandra Amass of Purdue University, United States; Jordi Casal Fábrega of Centre de Recerca en Sanitat Animal [CReSA], Barcelona, Spain; Scott Dee of the University of Minnesota, United States; Dominiek Maes of Ghent University, Belgium; and Keith Campbell and Jane MacDonald of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency [CFIA]).
Grateful appreciation is extended to all of these contributors.
Publication of this document was made possible by financial support from FAO and the World Bank.
vi Acronyms and abbreviations
Executive summary The emergence of pandemic H1N1 2009 (pH1N1) in the spring of 2009 has drawn attention once again to the potential threat of viruses hosted in animals, and is provoking considerable international concern. Humans are affected by the pandemic H1N1 2009 virus. As well as pigs, there are reports of turkeys, ferrets, cats and dogs being infected.
In recent years, viral swine diseases have had a significant impact on human health and people’s livelihoods. The introduction of African swine fever to the Caucasus, porcine high fever disease in Asia, and earlier outbreaks of classical swine fever and foot-and-mouth disease in Europe and Taiwan Province of China have all had devastating effects on agricultural economies.
The pandemic H1N1 2009 outbreak and initial uncertainties about the role of pigs in disseminating the virus led the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the World Bank to give the highest priority to developing tools for improving biosecurity in pig production. The biosecurity principles outlined in this paper serve to limit pig-to-pig transmission of disease and reduce the impact of infectious swine diseases, including their economic losses. These principles derive directly from scientific knowledge of the epidemiology and transmission of key swine pathogens.
Routes of disease transmission in pigs One of the most common routes of transmission for infectious agents is direct pig-to-pig contact: movement of infected pigs in close physical contact with non-infected pigs is decisive in transmitting diseases. Disease transmission through infected semen is well-documented. The role of people in disease transmission has been studied closely over the last decade: they can transport pathogens on footwear, clothing, hands, etc. People can carry viruses on their nasal mucosae (nasal carriers) without being infected. They can also be infected and shed pathogens as healthy or sick carriers. People also determine the movements of domestic animals and products among herds, markets and regions. Economic forces can lead to animals being moved over large distances, which increases the possibility of geographical spread of disease.
Vehicles and equipment can be instrumental in spreading diseases. Airborne transmission is more difficult to document, but has been studied experimentally. As some pathogens can survive in meat waste, specific attention must be paid to the use of food wastes in feeding pigs. Feed, water and bedding can all become contaminated and play a role in maintaining diseases. Faeces from infected pigs can contain large quantities of pathogenic viruses, bacteria or parasites: thus the application of manure to agricultural land may introduce pathogens into the human food chain and ecosystem, if due care is not taken during storage and spreading. Birds, rodents, stray dogs and cats, wildlife and feral pigs, together with arthropods, can all be potential carriers, whether through mechanical transmission or by being infected.
Good practices for biosecurity in the pig sector viii Pig production systems In most countries, a variety of different pig production systems exist, from the simplest, with minimal investment, to large-scale market-oriented enterprises. This paper groups pig production systems into four categories, based on the size of herds, the production goals
and husbandry management:
scavenging pigs is the most basic traditional system of keeping pigs and the one most commonly reported in both urban and rural areas of developing countries.
In this free-range system, pigs roam freely around the household and surrounding area, scavenging and feeding in the street, from garbage dumps or from neighbouring land or forests around villages. Few arrangements are made to provide the pigs with housing. Depending on the local situation, pigs may be free-ranging for most of the year and penned during the rainy season. They may be housed at night in a small shelter, to protect them against theft and predators. Keeping scavenging pigs requires minimal inputs and low investment of labour, with no or limited money invested in concentrated feed or vaccines.
Small-scale confined pig production is common in developing and transition countries. Pigs are confined to a shelter, which can range from a simple pen made with local materials to more modern housing. The pigs are completely dependent on their keeper for feed, and receive tree branches, leaves, crop residues, agricultural by-products or prepared feed. Smallholders raise pigs for both subsistence and commercial reasons. Pork is supplied to local markets and to more distant urban markets, through a complex marketing and transport system. Within this system, the financial risks for the producer can be high and there is limited support from organizations and professional bodies for technical inputs or services such as insurance.
large-scale confined pig production vary in size, but are generally significantly larger than farms in the previously described categories. Because consumers seek to purchase food at the lowest price, but the price of inputs is rising, the profit margin per pig is decreasing. Producers participating in global commodity pork markets must continually reduce the cost of production per pig to be profitable.
Production can be on one site only or on several sites that are all part of the same structure. The major cost reduction measures that can be implemented when moving from small-scale to large-scale confined production are through increased farm size, specialization of farming activities, consolidation of the different steps of pig production, and adoption of an “all-in-all-out” production flow at each site, with implementation of some or even extensive biosecurity protocols. Large pig farms may be family-owned, affiliated to companies or corporately owned.
large-scale outdoor pig production, animals are confined by fencing, but are mainly outdoors; there is therefore less need for investment in bricks and mortar facilities.
These farms can brand and sell pork for higher prices, and will often have a larger portfolio of activities, including agro-tourism or hunting for example.
attitudes and behaviours to reduce risk in all activities involving domestic, captive/exotic and wild animals and their products. Biosecurity measures should be used to avoid the entry of pathogens into a herd or farm (external biosecurity) and to prevent the spread of disease to uninfected animals within a herd or farm and to other farms, when the pathogen is already present (internal biosecurity). This paper does not present vaccination as a biosecurity measure per se.
The following are the three main elements of biosecurity:
Within each of these three elements, the measures taken to improve biosecurity depend on the pig production system concerned and the local geographic and socio-economic conditions. Segregation measures include controlling the entry of pigs from outside farms, markets or villages; implementing quarantine for newly purchased animals; limiting the number of sources of replacement stocks; fencing a farm area and controlling access for people, as well as birds, bats, rodents, cats and dogs; maintaining adequate distances between farms; providing footwear and clothing to be worn only on the farm; and using an all-in-all-out management system. Cleaning and disinfection measures may involve the use of high-pressure and low-pressure washers, and will be implemented on not only buildings on the premises, but also vehicles, equipment, clothing and footwear.
The willingness to implement measures depends greatly on the investment capacity and social and economic status of the producers and other stakeholders. For meaningful change to take place in rural communities, those involved must have a clear understanding of the economic importance of pig production for their owners’ livelihoods and the resource base that enables appropriate sustainable biosecurity measures to be developed;
this depends on having a well-designed communication plan.
Good practices The implementation of biosecurity measures in scavenging pig production systems is constrained by the producers’ limited capacity to invest resources and time, and by the nature of scavenging pig production. However, there are simple measures that can be recommended and that are mainly related to segregation: new pigs introduced into a village Good practices for biosecurity in the pig sector x must be free of disease, and particular attention is required when they are purchased from a market. The use of quarantine is very important. There is also concern over sows and boars that are moved from one location to another for mating. The health status of the boars needs to be known, particularly regarding diseases of concern. It is common practice for poor pig farmers to sell animals for slaughter as soon as disease is suspected. The marketing of sick animals is a serious disease risk, as these incubating or excreting sick pigs disseminate diseases, particularly when they are sold at live-animal markets. This practice should be prevented. The use of untreated pig swill must be avoided, and is often prohibited by national regulations. In the case of unusual pig deaths, veterinary services should be informed, so that immediate actions can be taken to control disease outbreaks; proper disposal of carcasses by burying, composting or burning is also crucial. Cleaning of night shelters and equipment must be emphasized. Disinfection is unlikely to be practicable.